A conception of insight is proposed, based on a systems and informationprocessing framework and using current neuroscience concepts, as an integration of information that results in a new symbolization of experience with a significant change in self-image and a transformation of nondeclarative procedural knowledge into declarative knowledge. Since procedural memory and knowledge, seen to include emotional and relationship issues, is slow to change, durable emotional and behavioral change often requires repeated practice, a need not explicitly addressed in standard psychoanalytic technique. Working through is thus seen as also encompassing nondynamic factors. The application of these ideas to therapeutic technique suggests possible therapeutic interventions beyond interpretation. An illustrative clinical vignette is presented.
A conception of insight is proposed, based on a systems and informationprocessing framework and using current neuroscience concepts, as an integration of information that results in a new symbolization of experience with a significant change in self-image and a transformation of nondeclarative procedural knowledge into declarative knowledge. Since procedural memory and knowledge, seen to include emotional and relationship issues, is slow to change, durable emotional and behavioral change often requires repeated practice, a need not explicitly addressed in standard psychoanalytic technique. Working through is thus seen as also encompassing nondynamic factors. The application of these ideas to therapeutic technique suggests possible therapeutic interventions beyond interpretation. An illustrative clinical vignette is presented.
T he achievement of insight has historically been considered the major engine of change in psychoanalysis. Although relational theorists have introduced alternative explanations for therapeutic action, insight continues for most to be considered an important factor.
Here I am interested in exploring what does (or doesn't) happen between the experience of insight and any consequent emotional or behavioral change. I will explore the various definitions and conceptions of insight and offer one (see Rosenblatt and Thickstun 1977) , based on an information-processing and systems framework and including current neuroscience concepts. I call attention to the relevance of repeated practice for effecting change in behavior and note the implications of this framework for therapeutic interventions beyond interpretation of unconscious material.
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There have been varied concepts and definitions of insight. In general psychiatry, it refers to the recognition of one's own behavior as abnormal. Early in the development of psychoanalysis, Freud (1905; Breuer and Freud 1895) used the term to refer to the conscious recovery of repressed memories. With the advent of the structural theory, the concept was seen to involve the integration into the ego of aspects of the id: "Where id was, there ego shall be" (Freud 1933, p. 80) . Neubauer (1979) , after maintaining that no fully satisfactory analytic definition exists, proposed a definition that explicitly invokes structural theory and the power of making hitherto unconscious memories conscious. "Essentially, insight during psychoanalysis comprises the expansion of the ego by self-observation, memory recovery, cognitive participation, and reconstruction in the context of af fective reliving" (p. 29). However, memory recovery alone does not produce insight, unless there is a comparison with current experience and beliefs that enables a judgment to be made that they are maladaptive and unnecessary. Moreover, insight may occur in relation to current experience, without the need for recovery of repressed memories.
A common distinction has been made between intellectual and emotional insight. Richfield (1954) , in like vein, distinguishes descriptive insight, knowledge by second-hand description, from ostensive insight, knowledge by first-hand acquaintance. Anna Freud (1981) similarly distinguishes insight, attention to the inner world, from orientation to the outside world, which for her constitutes understanding. Myerson (1965) labels the former "psychoanalytic insight" and the latter "reality-oriented insight." I will return later to this distinction in connection with the factor of self-image in insight.
Some have defined as insight only those "discoveries" that are "true." Everything else is defined as "pseudo-insight" (Kris 1956 ). Such an imposition of truth-value on the concept seems to hold the concept hostage to contemporary value judgments of what constitutes "truth." We would then be forced to consider certain misguided insights of Freud, which were based on now obsolete knowledge, to be nothing more than mistakes. It would seem more useful to define the concept phenomenologically, in terms of its experience, permitting the category of false insights.
EXPLANATIONS OF THE FUNCTION OF INSIGHT
Just as with its def inition, functional explanations of how insight works are diverse. In Psychoanalytic Terms and Concepts, Moore and Fine (1990) say, "As resistances are interpreted, repressed ideational content returns and is now accepted by the ego, so that psychic reorganization is facilitated" (p. 99). As with many of our explanations, this one seems to substitute description for explanation, using terms that are themselves in need of definition. It does not explain why the ego accepts the recently repressed content simply because of an interpretation, what constitutes psychic reorganization, or how this is facilitated. Poland (1988) asserts that "insight relieves anxiety by extending perspective, placing immediate inner conflicts in the context of a broader view of one's dynamic and genetic self " (p. 367). However, this explanation doesn't clarify how this occurs, nor does it take into account that insight may at times increase anxiety rather than diminish it.
Structural theory is often invoked to claim that insight promotes "ego integration," but it doesn't really specify what this is or how it occurs. "Ego" is a hypothetical construct, referring to a presumably organized group of psychological functions. To say that the ego becomes more integrated is to say simply that the organized functions become more organized. How this occurs, again, remains unspecified.
Some have maintained that insight follows change rather than causes it. Sampson (1991) reports: "as Mr. A. began to disconfirm his painful unconscious belief that his mother rejected him because he was stupid, inadequate, and bad, he felt safe enough to remember her rejections and how he had experienced them as a child" (p. 206). However, one may consider that insight, just as other psychological processes, can occur in the absence of consciousness. Kris (1956) implies as much-"before insight has reached awareness (or, if it does, only for flickering moments) . . . " (p. 452)-as does Poland (1988) : "Perhaps the deepest level is that in which understanding is most thoroughly integrated . . . without having to resort to conscious thought" (pp. 347-348) . If this is so, then, Mr. A.'s disconfirming his belief may be considered an unconscious insight, and, as will be seen later, such an alteration of selfrepresentation or self-image can be an important factor in change. Michels (1986) seems to finesse the question by suggesting that the critical factor is not the knowledge acquired in the insight, but the process of collaboratively seeking it, which makes one more psychologically minded and "more insight-oriented, if not more insightful" (p. 608). Regardless of the benefits of collaboration, focusing on the goal-seeking process does not eliminate the necessity of explaining what happens when the goal is attained.
Only two writers explicitly note that insight is closely related to the patient's self-image. Greenson, in a panel discussion reported by Altman (1964) , is quoted as saying that insight must be pursued by making reconstructive interpretations in which the specific self-images of the patient at a given time have to be clearly defined (p. 627). The implication seems to be that analysands must connect how they viewed themselves at the time of the traumatic wishes and fears that caused the pathological repression. One can infer that the therapeutic effect involves comparison with the analysand's current self-image. Pressman (1969a) concurs, saying, "insight comes about when the impulse or the felt anxiety is linked with the present-day self-image" (p. 194). He later elaborates (1969b): "it is inevitably important and completely necessary for the patient to have knowledge of both the activity and presence of the archaic self-image in directing his life (in order to realize the true dimension of the unconscious), as well as the present-day self-image (in order to realize its applicability to himself as he is today)" (p. 349). Perhaps this is the distinctive difference between intellectual and emotional insight. The former is about something, without any change in the individual's self-image.
ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF INSIGHT
Before addressing what I think characterizes insight, I must provide some relevant background about information-processing conceptions of perception and cognition, both essential to insight. Perception is not simply a veridical registration of events, as might be obtained with a camera or tape recorder. It is a complicated process, involving the successive integration of information through interaction with information about the memory of previous experience, as well as current attentional "set" and ongoing activity. This is information processing, and it results in the development of meaning. The initial percept-or "ception," as George Klein (1959) termed it-has undergone refinement and abstraction. To the extent that integrated perception is not simply a reproduction of the perceived event, but a result of abstraction of associated memories, attitudes, etc., it functions as a symbol or symbolic element. I use these terms not in the psychoanalytic or linguistic sense, but in Susanne Langer's sense of "another aspect of symbols . . . the formulation of experience by the process of symbolization" (1964, p. 59 ).
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The manipulation, elaboration, and combination of such symbolic elements constitute the activity known as thought or cognition (see Rosenblatt and Thickstun 1977; Noy 1978; Olds 2000) . 2 When, in the course of such processing, a significantly novel conf iguration of symbols or symbolic elements occurs, it may become experienced as creative thought or insight. An insight may be to an affect, wish, idea, or relationship. The term implies a sense of discovery, a connection. Thus, in a previous publication (Rosenblatt and Thickstun 1977) , insight was conceptualized as a new symbolization of experience.
From a related viewpoint, the human brain is seen to be essentially a pattern-matching or categorizing organ (Kelso 1995) . Patterns and categories are abstractions that are created, and they thus function as symbolic elements. Edelman (1989) considers the basic brain activity to be categorization and recategorization-in other words, pattern matching. He thus provides a neuroanatomical basis for the development of neuronal groups that generate and match patterns. Rosenfeld (1988) , building on Edelman's ideas, argues that memories and perceptions are not locally stored, discrete "engrams" of information, but are recategorizations of previously encountered events. 3 Intuition, for example, is a more or less sudden and full-blown consciousness of a conclusion or judgment, without awareness of 1 Langer follows Ernst Cassirer (1957) in regarding symbols as having primarily a formulative function, which involves abstraction. She asserts that individuals respond to outside stimuli, "producing images, notions, figments of all sorts that serve as symbols for ideas. . . . That is the sense of saying we have ideas about what we actually see" (p. 126). She thus states, "Any device whereby we make an abstraction is a symbolic element, and all abstraction involves symbolization" (p. 60).
2 Although radical connectionism (see O'Brien and Opie 2002) claims that cognition never involves a symbolic medium, the symbols that are rejected are mainly linguistic with fixed referents, not the kinds discussed above. A neuronal net may be considered to be the anatomical basis of a functional symbolic element, representing a pattern or category. Moreover, Marcus (2001) has shown how neural systems could be organized so as to manipulate symbols. 3 In asserting that information is not some engram passively registered by the brain, but rather a result of categorization, Rosenfeld states, "There are no symbols in the brain; there are patterns of activity that acquire different meaning in different contexts" (p. 136). However, considering the context of his statement, he was arguing against the conception of anatomically discrete engrams, rather than functional entities, such as Langer's symbolic elements. previous cognitive steps. It represents an unconscious pattern-matching cognition (only loosely related to primary process), that may become conscious under certain conditions (see Rosenblatt and Thickstun 1994) .
In the same manner, insight may be seen as a form of unconscious pattern recognition and matching that may become conscious. We speak of "unconscious affect" to designate a psychic process that, if it became conscious, would be experienced as affect. Similarly, we may think of unconscious insight as a psychic process that, if it became conscious, would be experienced as insight. While the terms are often used interchangeably, the term intuition is more usually applied to the discovery of connections in the external world (e.g., an intuitive understanding of spatial relationships), while insight, in the psychoanalytic realm, refers to discoveries about one's own or another's internal world (e.g., an insight into one's motivations).
In psychoanalytic insight, the essential end process is the discovery of a mismatch between a newly recognized pattern and another existing pattern, resulting then in a new patterning. For example, the comparison may be between a recently realized infantile self-image and an existing mature self-image, resulting in the schematized "I've been behaving as though I were still that small child. . . . But I see myself differently now." It may be with another internal object, with the discovery "It's as though I feel you're my mother. . . . But you're not my mother!" Usually this kind of discovery also involves the recognition of a different relationship pattern, as "Even if you behave like her, I'm not a child now, so I don't need to react like that anymore." So once again the process involves a comparison with a current self-image. The reduction in anxiety, if it occurs, may come as the result of a different appraisal from the standpoint of a mature self-image: "Maybe there's nothing to be afraid/guilty of now."
To recapitulate, insight is a result of unconscious pattern-matching activity, wherein a mismatch is found, provoking a new constellation or pattern that represents a new symbolization of experience, crucially involving a changed self-image. It now may be clearer why an insight may or may not be correct, just as an intuitive judgment may or may not be. It is confirmed or disconfirmed by subsequent, more secondaryprocess cognitive activity.
WORKING THROUGH
Almost all writers acknowledge that insight alone does not automatically lead to behavioral change. The assumption of automatic change has been epitomized as the "Aha!" theory of insight, often represented in movies, whereby the actor exclaims, for example, "Aha! I remember I wanted to kill my brother when I was age five, so now I understand and I'm cured!"
There are instances in which insight may occasion a change in an individual's self-representation that of itself evokes an internal change, before any consequent action may be taken. The individual may experience a signif icant rise in self-esteem and feel considerably better (e.g., less guilty and more competent). However, almost every emotional disorder that we see in treatment involves maladaptive behavioral components that arise in response to inner states of conflict, anxiety, depression, and the like. While insight frees the patient to choose more adaptive ways of behaving, it is necessary that such alternative modes of reacting be tried (see Valenstein 1983) . Many comment that a key factor in the effectiveness of insight is the patient's capacity to translate insight into action, but seldom explore just what is involved in this capacity.
The means by which insight is translated into action has been ascribed to the process of working through. This process is usually thought to consist of repeated interpretations of a dynamic issue, both in the same and in different experiential contexts (see Fenichel 1938) . This procedure assumes not only that initial insight is neither necessarily durable nor easily generalizable, but also that effective action does not regularly emerge. Thus, unconscious wishes, fears, and fantasies must repeatedly be made conscious, every time they occur, whether in the same context or in a different one.
Various explanations have been advanced to account for this necessary process. They range from Freud's resistance of the id, adhesiveness of the libido, and the repetition compulsion (Freud 1926a,b) to the analysand's reluctance to try new behaviors out of anxiety (Valenstein 1983; Cooper 1989) or unwillingness to relinquish certain gratifications (for reviews of the literature, see Brenner 1987; Aron 1991) . Developmentalists such as Shane and Shane (1995) assert that working through entails a developmental process "of relating authentically, and of being able to both benefit from and contribute to such mature intimacy within the analytic dyad" (p. 373). Brenner (1987) has contended that such explanations are "if not mere rewordings, at best ad hoc explanations" (p. 101), since they are in the last analysis rewordings of various aspects of analyzing intrapsychic conflict. I agree, but while Brenner maintains that it is solely analysis of the patient's defensive patterns that takes so long, I believe there are factors other than anxiety and unanalyzed unconscious conflict that account for the delay in change after insight.
Several authors have called attention to nonconflictual elements that influence the transformation of insight into action. Early on, Alexander (1940) dismissed the concept of repetition compulsion as an abstraction irrelevant to the clinical understanding of patients. He invoked the learning process, stating that "the best evidence for such a repetitive tendency is offered by . . . the violin player [who] has the greatest difficulty in giving up old faulty movements which have become automatic by faulty practice" (p. 14). Tenzer (1984) has pointed to Piaget's emphasis on the need for repetition in the acquisition of new cognitive structures, so that they may be integrated with others. Stewart (1963) pointed out that Freud's initial use of the term working through was in reference to id resistance, which he clearly distinguished from other kinds of resistance. Adhesiveness of libido and psychical inertia, as components of id resistance, were viewed by Freud as "independent factors," implying that they were not necessarily linked to dynamic conflicts and were at bottom constitutionally determined. According to Stewart, they involved abilities such as "the capacity to accept frustration [and] the wish for and capacity to test reality" (p. 482).
A notable advocate of technical interventions "beyond interpretation," Gedo (1995) drew on neuroscience concepts to assert that working through involves "the establishment of new neural networks through gradual habituation. . . . [It is] best understood as an educational process . . . , 'a technology of instruction' . . . . [teaching] various procedural skills . . . " (pp. 339, 350). He believed that "when interpretations require frequent repetition, it is very likely that they are of minor relevance, if not actually invalid" (p. 386). Novey (1962) explained the time required for working through by reference to the childhood core of the neurosis, dependent on automatized affective patterns of experiencing and response, which are more resistant to change than are cognitive patterns. "Therapy thus represents a means of establishing new automatisms through releasing repression and through the transference modes of 'looking at life in a different way,' if even only experimentally. Such a point of view argues for incorporating learning theory into a psychoanalytic frame of reference" (p. 673).
THE ROLE OF PRACTICE
I now want to call attention to an element that is seldom addressed explicitly in the literature-namely, the function of practice in translating insight into consistent and more adaptive behavior.
Hardly any insights are translated into flawless and consistent behavior on the first try. They require practice, as learning any new skill does. The common use of the term working through to refer to the repeated visitation of conflicts and behavior patterns in psychoanalysis conflates two separable processes.
The application of an insight to various contexts, to resolve defenses and to deepen and broaden understanding, certainly occurs and is an essential part of an analysis. Often when one revisits a defensive system, further and deeper insights are obtained, over and above that afforded by the original interpretation. However, the term is also used to refer to repeated trials in the same context, whereby a new pattern becomes progressively more consistent, automatic, and resistant to disruption. This latter is a form of learning through practice, well described in academic psychology, and, while subject to conflictual intrapsychic factors, it is not in itself necessarily a product of unconscious dynamics. (Note the references to automatisms and learning theory in the authors cited above.)
Clearly insight is not the only motivation (in or out of treatment) that may evoke efforts to change a relationship pattern. In treatment, identification with the analyst, increased self-esteem through support by the analyst, and a number of other factors may provide this impetus. Whatever the motivation, however, change may require practice. With it, the newly conscious behavior becomes automatic, overwriting the old. The old procedure is not usually eliminated, but remains capable of reasserting its dominance should the new one be disrupted by stress that evokes regression. Alternatively, the repeated success of an action in providing desirable consequences reinforces its stable place in the person's behavioral repertoire. It is important to emphasize that the insight, representing a new symbolization of experience or a new patterning, directs the subsequent practicing.
To rephrase, practice is almost always necessary, but it helps to have the insight to know what to practice on and how. Formalized practice in standard cognitive behavior therapy usually focuses on the alteration of observable behavior or conscious attitudes and feelings. Here I refer, instead, to attempts made to "catch" oneself after the unconscious determinants of behavior have been made conscious, and to consciously remind oneself of the changed viewpoint and behavior that is now possible. Often this practice of new patterns occurs within the therapeutic relationship, as therapist and analysand clarify the transference reactions. With more integrated patients, this practice of acquired insights happens so smoothly and inconspicuously that it appears that insight automatically produces change. But it doesn't.
The progression from insight to effective action may be slowed or inhibited by four kinds of conditions:
1. Dynamic issues directly relevant to the content of the insight, including transference issues, as yet unanalyzed. For example, after insight about avoiding intimate relationships because of fear of vulnerability to abandonment, inhibition may continue because of unanalyzed castration anxiety or transference opposition. A number of other authors and I have delineated these dynamic factors that militate against change (see Pressman 1969a,b; Rangell 1981; Valenstein 1983; Rosenblatt 1987) .
2. Dynamic issues not directly related to content but surrounding the issue of active practicing. These include continued unconscious fantasies of magical gratification without effort and an image of oneself as helpless and dependent (Rangell 1981; Valenstein 1983) . The obverse dynamic is fear of any active striving as inviting abandonment or retaliation.
3. "Structural" issues that may once have arisen out of dynamic conflict, but have resulted in a nondynamic lack of capacities (unrelated to symbolic content), often termed deficit conditions. An example would be a self-image deficient in any sense of effective agency. Individuals inhibited by this condition have no conception of being able to practice effortfully. Another example would be deficient tolerance of frustration and strong affect, whereby inevitable initial failures in active practicing provoke giving up and quitting (Rosenblatt 1981) .
4. Neurophysiological limitations of the CNS and the process of learning, where the shift to conscious control entails errors before smooth automatization can be accomplished. As noted above, the con-version of an automatic behavior to a controlled conscious one, which can then be changed and reconverted to a new automatic procedure, does not occur flawlessly. Here is where practice does not immediately make perfect, but errors are made in attempting to operationalize an insight.
IMPLICATIONS FOR TREATMENT
If active practice is necessary, along with some initial failures, the question arises whether the analyst should encourage active practice in some way as part of an analytic treatment. (So far as I know, this is not taught as part of standard analytic technique.) Encouragement might be only implicit, in the form of some educational intervention. It may be helpful to convey to the patient the fact that failing in initial efforts to change behavior is almost inevitable; it should not be assumed that there must always be conflicts, as yet unanalyzed, to explain these early failures. This may be especially helpful when the analysand responds to such failures with punitive self-condemnation. This information about nondynamic factors may then be combined with a dynamic interpretation of the analysand's readiness to berate him-or herself and, perhaps, of the analysand's grandiose expectation of immediate perfection. Here the dynamic exploration focuses on the consequences of the failure, rather than on its yet unanalyzed causes.
CASE VIGNETTE
Julie, thirty-eight years old and married with two daughters, sought treatment for social anxiety and a troubled relationship with the younger of them. The patient would experience critical, angry reactions to her young teenager's behavior and then feel remorseful and guilty for being overpunitive. She was especially angered by what she felt was her daughter's irresponsibility, particularly her preoccupation with her looks and popularity. She described her daughter as spending hours in front of the mirror, preening or agonizing over a blemish, and she feared her daughter was becoming a self-centered, superficial airhead who would amount to nothing in life.
The patient grew up in a family with a perfectionistic father, who expected perfect performance from her, and a narcissistic mother, who favored and extravagantly praised Julie's younger sister as "the beautiful one" but acknowledged the patient to be "the smart one."
Julie organized a major part of her self-esteem around her identity as "the smart one" and identified with her father's perfectionism.
Although she at first denied any competitive or angry feelings toward her sister, it became clear as the analysis progressed that she displaced her hostility toward her sister onto her younger daughter, who was prettier than the older one. Following a visit from her sister, Julie became excessively critical of her younger daughter, and the analyst was able to interpret the displacement in an emotionally convincing way to the patient. She responded with intense self-criticism, vowing "never again" to unjustly attack her daughter.
Shortly thereafter, Julie came to her analytic session depressed and agitated because she had harshly berated her daughter for "wasting time" with her "primping" in preparation for a date. She realized too late that she was again acting out her long-standing resentment toward her sister and was relentless in her self-blaming. "How stupid can I be?" she kept repeating. "I should have known! We went over that, yet I did it again!" At this point, the analyst explored other motivations for her reactions. Julie's envy of this daughter's beauty and popularity came into focus, related to her long-standing feelings of unattractiveness, social shyness, and awkwardness. Julie hoped this additional understanding would enable her to be more supportive of her daughter. In addition, the analyst wondered if she may be having mixed feelings about the interpretations, appreciating them but also feeling somewhat injured and annoyed. With her perfectionistic self-expectations, he said, she may have expected herself to have known these things about herself and not have to be told. She reluctantly agreed and was reminded of her father's expectations, which had become her own.
Despite the exploration of her envy of her sister and her daughter, her identification with her father, and her narcissistic injury from the interpretations, there occurred another incident of anger and criticism directed at her daughter. The patient having become quite discouraged and self-critical, the analyst told her the story of the tourist who became lost on the way to a concert, stopped an old man on the street, and asked, "Excuse me, sir, but can you tell me how to get to Carnegie Hall?" The old man looked at him and said, kindly, "Practice, my son, constant practice!" Julie was silent, apparently shocked. She then said she never thought about practicing something to master it. It somehow seemed to her that she had to get it right the first time. She spoke with tears about her father's harsh criticism of any mistakes she made in learning to ski (where one has to practice doing the opposite of the "instinctive" urge to lean into the slope).
She discussed with interest what practicing might entail, and she and the analyst jointly concluded that it required a number of things. She thought it important to try to be alert in interchanges with her daughter to signs of growing irritation and "catch" herself before it got out of hand, reminding herself that "she's my daughter, not my sister." Important to her was also the opportunity to discuss once again in the analytic sessions the dynamics of her vulnerability to such interactions with her daughter, in an uncritical way, so she could "get it down more pat." It was agreed that it was helpful to examine in retrospect what might have triggered the "slip," without beating herself up about it. The analyst agreed that all were important in interrupting the automatic sequence of maladaptive behavior and consciously endeavoring to substitute more appropriate responses, so that repeated practice would make the new behavior automatic instead. In subsequent encounters with her daughter she was able to accept "slips" on her part with much less self-condemnation and more attention to identifying and modifying her automatic responses, which she was progressively able to do.
The intervention described above would be considered, in Eissler's model of psychoanalysis (1953), a "parameter" that diverges from the ideal of employing only interpretation in the psychoanalytic hour, if not actually a contamination of psychoanalysis with a behavior modification approach. In recent years, however, psychoanalytic technique has increasingly transcended the constraints of Eissler's model (see, e.g., Greenberg and Mitchell 1983; Renik 1993 Renik , 1996 Ehrenberg 1992) . It should be noted that Freud (1940) believed that educational techniques were not antithetical to a psychoanalytic process, as long as they respected the patient's individuality. Some authors have introduced psychoeducational techniques into analytic therapy to deal with "apraxias" or skills deficiencies (Gedo 1979 (Gedo , 1988 and to enhance competent coping skills (Basch 1988) .
Others have used relational theory to justify the use of formal cognitive-behavioral interventions. Frank (1993) has argued that "actionoriented techniques . . . , judiciously employed, can at times be compatible with psychoanalytic therapy, and for many patients these techniques can substantially enhance that therapy" (p. 537). Wachtel (1993) asserts that a "patient's reactions to so-called interventions are no less analyzable than are any of the events of experiences that occur in a more traditionally conducted analysis. . . . Interventions are relational events, and the exploration of their meaning to the patient is a crucial part of their effective utilization." (p. 595).
PROCEDURAL VS. DECLARATIVE KNOWLEDGE
If practice is indeed usually necessary to effect durable and consistent change, questions then arise as to why this is so and how practice works to effect the changes. I believe that current neuroscience concepts offer possible answers to these questions.
The neurophysiological underpinnings of the need to practice may be the two kinds of memory, declarative and nondeclarative, which store different kinds of knowledge (see Squire and Schacter 2002) . 4 They involve anatomically distinct substrates in the brain, declarative memory being primarily hippocampus-based, while nondeclarative memory has other neural loci (e.g., amygdala, striatum, or cerebellum). Declarative knowledge is knowledge of facts or events that can be directly recalled (e.g., what happened last week or how many ounces make a pound). One kind of nondeclarative knowledge (often termed implicit knowledge) is procedural knowledge, which underlies skills or procedures and encodes information that cannot be easily described in language. For example, it is difficult to put into words one's knowledge (stored in memory) of the procedure for riding a bike-one just knows how to do it.
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A l l a n R o s e n b l a t t 202 4 The biological reality of multiple memory systems is now widely accepted, with few exceptions (see Whittlesea and Price 2001) . Neuroscientists would assume that any behavior subsequent to an emotional experience, such as an enactment or phobia, that is expressed through performance rather than recollection and is not consciously related to any past event, results from nondeclarative (procedural) memory (Squire and Schacter 2002) . Shevrin (1999) , assuming that a single experience results in a declarative memory, claims, "An episodic [declarative] memory can form unconsciously and can prime later behavior without awareness. . . . [Therefore] enactments, transference, or otherwise, do not necessarily reflect procedural memories." However, singleevent learning need not be declarative (see Le Doux 1996) . Moreover, an emotional event may result in both declarative and nondeclarative memories.
5 Bucci (1997) , in her multiple code theory, similarly differentiates between symbolic and subsymbolic systems of information processing. The integration of the two systems is accomplished through a "referential process." However, her use of "symbolic" employs a more narrow definition of symbol. "Symbols," she states, "are discrete entities-images or words" (p. 159). Although her subsymbolic processing is equated with a connectionist model, as are conceptions of procedural knowledge, she does not address the underlying memory functions, the greater resistance of "subsymbolic processing" to change, or the relevance of practice.
Not all action procedures are automatic, like riding a bike. There are also controlled procedures, determined by conscious declarative input of rules, that are slow and require a great deal of attention. But they are flexible, capable of being modified by altering the declarative input. The automatic type is determined by procedural information and requires no attention: though fluid and efficient, it is difficult to modify. Practice through repetition permits hitherto controlled and conscious procedures to become automatized, through which process the declarative input is transformed into unconscious procedural information and memory. For example, driving an automobile is initially a controlled procedure for the beginner, requiring conscious attention to many rules, but with practice it becomes automatic and unconscious.
A relational configuration and the associated emotions appear to be procedurally organized (see Clyman 1992; Grigsby and Stevens 2000; Westen and Gabbard 2002) . That is, a relationship is represented by what one does with another and how one interacts. Thus, the procedure itself is unconscious, and one is aware only of the consequences. These procedures are unconsciously developed strategies (heuristics) to meet various emotional needs. They may be adaptive at the time they are adopted but in later contexts may become maladaptive.
However, procedural knowledge is more difficult to alter than declarative knowledge. (Think of the money spent on golf lessons to change a bad swing.) These procedures are changed by interrupting the automatic procedural enactment and converting it to a controlled conscious procedure, which can then be changed through providing intermediate declarative information.
At this point, I must make it clear that while procedural knowledge is structurally unconscious, it may also be subject to dynamic issues, rendering it dynamically unconscious as well. It is usually this dual situation with relationships that we clinically encounter. When defensive dynamic issues are resolved with the achievement of insight and new declarative knowledge, the procedural knowledge structure remains to be dealt with.
To address the question of how practice effects change, one can speculate on the means by which practice shifts declarative knowledge and memory to procedural. With many repetitions, the synaptic weightings of a neural net become more dif ferentiated, since extraneous activities are not repeated as often as essential ones. Thus a synaptic "groove" is worn in the net. Current views contend that ambiguity evokes consciousness, so that complex choices may be made or at least reviewed. As ambiguity is progressively reduced, so is the need and signal for conscious choice. The result is a procedure out of consciousness, or automatization.
CONCLUSION
Not only can the ongoing discoveries of cognitive science illuminate psychoanalytic theory; they also promise to improve analysts' therapeutic effectiveness. The conceptualization of insight within an information-processing framework affords an integration of psychoanalytic theory with current neuroscience, as does recognizing the role of practice in behavioral change after insight. Moreover, the recognition of nondynamic learning factors, related to procedural memory and its resistance to rapid change, has implications for psychoanalytic technique. Rather than diluting our discipline, innovative applications of these discoveries can enrich our therapeutic armamentarium.
